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ABSTRACT
Privatisation, liberalisation and re-regulation have become major forces shaping
societies and economies the world over. These developments have brought along major
changes in the ownership and regulated environment of utility industries. However, the
presence of substantial change on these issues has not led to convergence on important
issues across national business systems. This paper highlights the importance of the
continuing relevance of national institutions of corporate governance and employment
relations in the evolution of the electricity sector. The central question deals with the
importance of the market for corporate control (i.e. takeovers) in the evolution of the
electricity sector in Britain and Spain. Two contributions are provided. First, we show
how national-based explanations such as those presented in the Varieties of Capitalism
(VoC) theoretical framework constitute a key variable to understand cross-national
differences in the impact of the market for corporate control on the evolution of the
electricity sector. Second, we demonstrate how the institutionally-based VoC
perspective does not fully capture the political origins of the institutional frameworks of
the two countries – it is best complemented by incorporating notions of state activism in
contemporary capitalism.
Key Words: Globalisation, Liberalisation, Corporate Governance, State Activism,
Electricity Sector, Britain and Spain.
Contact Details: Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR),
Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, England. E-mail: R.Valdivielso@warwick.ac.uk
3Introduction
Privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation have brought major changes in the legal
and industry structure of utility companies in the European Union.1 These developments
have altered both the processes of policy-making and the extent and forms of public
control over suppliers. Traditionally, public sector dominance of network industries
derived its legitimacy from performing public tasks. These networks industries
underwent profound transformations in the last twenty years: from state-owned to
privatised companies, from regulated monopoly to re-regulated entities – all of which in
a new context of increased competition at the European level. For the specific case of
the electricity sector, two main EU directives (96/92/EC and 2003/54/EC) have forced
member states to open their domestic markets to foreign producers. These EU directives
have removed restrictions on the ability of firms to sell electricity in foreign markets. At
the same time, however, the establishment of a full level playing field has not taken
place since the Commission has not tackle issues related to the regulation of plant
opening that is still under the jurisdiction of member states. For instance, Spanish
policy-makers have used at times their power of administrative authorisation of new
plants to impose delays in approving the building of new generation capacities –
especially in regard to foreign producers (Arocena, et al., 1999: 393; Beato Blanco,
2005: 269). The resulting uncertainties meant that domestic producers have accounted
for the bulk of the new investment projects in generation plants (Crampes and Fabra,
2004: 15-16; Fraser, 1999: 36-37).
We analyse in this paper the importance of takeovers in the evolution of the
electricity sector in Britain and Spain. The above developments raised the potential
prominence of takeovers as a mode of entry in foreign markets. EU directives have
provided firms with the opportunities to sell electricity in other European markets but
member state’s control over the approval of new plants entails that acquiring an already
operating local firm constitutes the best option to develop a presence in foreign markets.
How important have been takeovers as a restructuring mechanism in the evolution of
1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the Corporate Governance and Regulation Workshop,
University of Manchester, November 17th 2006; and at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and
Regionalisation (University of Warwick), November 24th 2008. We would like to thank Reinhard
Bachmann, Michel Goyer, Jacint Jordana, Klaus Nielsen, Dwijen Rangnekar and Nikolaus Wolf for their
comments on the paper. The usual disclaimers apply.
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paper highlights the absence of convergence despite the introduction of many
liberalising measures. The transformation of electricity sector in Britain was
characterised by the prominence of takeovers as a restructuring mechanism in a
transition process from a fragmented structure dominated by domestic firms to one
where a few foreign firms are the key players. The evolution of the structure of the
Spanish electricity sector, in contrast, was marked by the consolidation of the market
power of the established companies with a substantial control by domestic players.
Takeovers have often been imposed on English electricity companies; they have been
negotiated in Spain.
The argument presented in this paper highlights the importance of the differences
in the national institutions of corporate governance (and employment relations) found in
the two countries. The adjustment process of electricity companies is best
conceptualised as a set of constraints and opportunities faced by managers in the
conduct of the business strategy of the firm. The institutions of corporate governance in
Britain expose the firm to the pressures of financial markets and force management to
seriously pay attention to the interests of minority shareholders. Takeovers have been
prominent in the transformation of the sector. The Spanish system of corporate
governance, in contrast, does not expose managers to the same extent to the pressures of
the financial markets. The prevalence of takeovers as a mechanism of firm adjustment
has been rather limited.
This paper incorporates the insights of the institutionally-based Varieties of
Capitalism (VoC) to account for the differences in the evolution of the electricity sector
in Britain and Spain in regard to the prominence of takeovers. The constellation of
domestic institutional frameworks acts as a mediator on the impact of new exogenous
(and endogenous) developments. The Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective, in
particular, has emphasised the critical importance of patterns of institutional
complementarities among the various sub-spheres (finance and corporate governance,
industrial relations, innovation system, and inter-firm relations) of the economy that
lead to diverging forms of behaviour on the part of economic actors (Hall and Soskice
2001a or b; Soskice 1999). The key insight is that the impact of an institution cannot be
studied in isolation as it is mediated by its interaction with other features of the national
institutional framework, therefore implying that different types of institutional fit are
possible (Hall and Franseze 1998). Therefore, the divergence in outcomes in the
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of institutional diversity in national institutions of corporate governance and, to a
smaller extent, employment relations. Nonetheless, the Varieties of Capitalism
perspective is incomplete as it underplays the importance of the political origins of
institutions. The point is not to deny the importance of institutions in the evolution of
national business systems – but to highlight how the choices of policy-makers can
contribute to the sets of incentives and constraints faced by firms. The study of the
transformation of the electricity sector in Britain and Spain is best served by
incorporating the insights of the institutionally-based VoC perspective with notions of
state activism.
The rest of this working paper is divided in four sections. First, we provide a
literature review of the main components and insights of Varieties of Capitalism
perspective with a critique based on the importance of the choices of policy-makers in
the origins of institutions. Second, we present the empirical data on the importance of
takeovers in the transformation of the electricity sector in Britain and Spain. Third, we
we review the contributions of the VoC perspective and of state activism to account for
the presence of empirical differences in the evolution of the electricity sector of the two
countries. Fourth, the conclusion is presented.
1. Varieties of Capitalism and the Importance of Institutions: A Literature Review
This section reviews the key features of the Varieties of Capitalism literature that
theoretically inform the research framework of the paper. The EU directives regarding
the liberalisation of the electricity sector present companies with new sets of challenges.
Will the liberalisation of the sector entails the convergence in the strategy of companies
across EU member states? The occurrence of many developments – globalisation,
regional trade integration, mobility of capital across borders – have seriously erodes
specific policy instruments that were used by governments to regulate the economy.
Nonetheless, substantial divergence remains between national business systems. For
institutionally-oriented scholars, the impact of the liberalising measures is mediated by
the institutional environment in which companies are embedded. The Varieties of
Capitalism perspective has emerged as a powerful theory to analyse issues related to the
stability and change in national business systems. It identifies national institutional
frameworks as the most important feature to understand the dynamics by which firms
6coordinate their activities in advanced capitalist economies. The first task of this section
consists in a presentation of the key concepts of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)
theoretical perspective – one of the leading institutionally-based perspectives in social
sciences2 (section 1.1) – followed by an analysis of the insights provided by the theory
for undertanding the issue of change in contemporary capitalism especially in regard to
the role of takeovers (section 1.2). The last part of this section, in contrast, highlights
the importance of the choice of policy-makers as an important aspect of the workings of
national business systems (section 1.3). The importance of state activism builds from a
fundamental criticism of the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective – namely
that it downplays the importance of politics and state action in advanced capitalist
economies (Howell, 2003; Morgan, 2005). The actions of policy-makers are largely
seen – for the Varieties of Capitalism perspective - within a context of helping domestic
firms in the processes by which their activities are coordinated (Schmidt, 2006: 5). The
discussion on state activism does not seek to reject the importance of institutions as an
explanatory variable – the central focus of VoC – but to bring the political dimension
and the importance of the choices of policy-makers into the analysis.
1.1 Varieties of Capitalism and the Sustainability of Cross-National Divergence:
An Institutional Approach
A key debate in social sciences concerns the extent to which the various sources of
pressure associated with the process of ‘globalisation’ in the world economy - the
liberalisation of international trade, the rise of international integration of production,
research, and marketing by the major multinational companies (MNCs), the moves to
regional integration in Europe and other major economic regions – are forcing national
business systems to convergence on each other (Garrett, 1998). A convergence
perspective emphasises that the room for manoeuvre of governments has been sharply
reduced given the increasing pressures of global economic competition. The end point
seems to lie in the convergence of policies and institutions toward the market friendly
end of the spectrum (Friedman, 2000 and 2006). However, this perspective has been
challenged by the presentation of overwhelming empirical evidence on the continuing
diversity of institutional arrangement across advanced capitalist economies (Crouch,
2 The key works in the Varieties of Capitalism literature are Hall and Soskice (2001a), Hall and Gingerich
(2001, 2004); Hall and Thelen, 2009; Hall, 2007; Hancké et al., 2007 and Soskice, 1999.
71996; Berger and Dore, 1996; Regini, 2000). Nonetheless, and despite the proliferation
of studies questioning the elimination of cross-national differences, convergence
theorists still cling to their argument by interpreting this empirical evidence as a laggard
situation. Thus, a comprehensive refutation of the convergence perspective requires the
researcher to supplement existing empirical data with both analytical criticism and an
empirically grounded explanation for the observed diversity.
The Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective appeared on the scene at that
critical juncture. This analytical framework is a “firm-centred political economy that
regards companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy” (Hall-Soskice, 2001a:
6). It is an institutionally-based theoretical perspective whose main focus “seeks to
understand institutional similarities and differences among the developed economies”
(ibid: 1) that, in turn, impact on outcomes. The central significance of this approach is
that it offers a comprehensive framework for explaining comparative economic
performance – differences in national institutional arrangements serving as the basis for
the process by which firms coordinate their activities – as greater institutional fit results
in superior performance (Hall and Gingerich, 2004). Therefore, from the Varieties of
Capitalism perspective, calls for ever greater deregulation of economic activities and
reliance upon unconstrained markets cannot be seen as universal propositions. The
efficacy of reforms is institutionally contingent. The Varieties of Capitalism perspective
is characterised by the importance of four key elements: institutional diversity,
institutional interaction, institutional complementarities, and institutionally-driven firm
coordination.
First, the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective emphasises broad
differences in the strategies of firms in advanced industrialised economies that cannot
be accounted by reference to questions of resource endowments. Hall and Soskice
(2001a: 15) instead stress the central position of (institutional) structure in conditioning
the strategy of the firm, but not in fully determining it. The Varieties of Capitalism
perspective focuses on five spheres of the political economy in which firms develop
relationships to resolve coordination problems: (1) financial systems or market for
corporate governance, (2) industrial relations arena, (3) education and training systems,
(4) inter-firm relations and (5) intra-firm relations (Hall and Soskice, 2001a: 27-32).
These spheres, in turn, are further divided into sub-spheres. For example, the main
institutional arrangements of corporate governance are the ownership structure of listed
8companies, the legal rights of minority investors, the accounting rules, and the process
of approval of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A).
Second, the specification of the importance of institutions highlights the centrality
of interaction between different institutional spheres. The basic analytical starting point
is that the impact of a single institution should not be seen in isolation, but as part of a
whole interactive process. The effects of an institution are contingent upon the specifics
of its interaction with other institutions – its impact varies according to the national
institutional configuration in which it is embedded (Hall, 1994). The approach
conceptualises the political economy as a set of a highly interdependent arenas where
the impact of institutional practices in one sphere – both on the behaviour of firms and
on economic performance – depends on the type of institutions present in other spheres.
For example, the presence of independent central banks results in lower rates of
inflation, but its impact on unemployment is shaped by the internal features of labour
organisations is labour organisation or labour market the right expression (Hall and
Franzese, 1998). The extent to which trade unions can pursue wage restraint mediates
the disciplinary effects of central bank independence on unemployment. In other words,
the same institution of independent central banking produces different outcomes
according to the configuration of domestic institutions in which it is embedded.
Therefore, institutional analyses and policy reforms that focus exclusively on
institutions found in a single sphere of the economy are misleading since the impact of a
single institution mediated by the overall (i.e. national level) institutional constellation
of which it is part.
Third, the interaction between institutions (located in different national
institutional frameworks) gives rise to different patterns of institutional
complementarities. Institutional complementarities refer to a situation whereby specific
institutional arrangements found in one sphere of the economy interact with those
prevalent in other spheres and make them more effective than they would otherwise be
on their own (Hall and Soskice, 2001a: 18). For example, the ability of companies to
succeed in market niches that demand firm-specific skills is significantly enhanced by
patterns of ownership concentration and rigid labour markets since they make it harder
for outsiders to proceed to hostile takeovers. Conversely, successful strategies in niches
of radical innovation are said to be supported by flexible labour markets and patterns of
ownership dispersion that make it easier for firms to allocate (high-risk) capital to new
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that the contribution of an institution is enhanced as a result of its interaction with
others. The purpose of the complementarities identified by the Varieties of Capitalism
perspective should be “judged” according to the extent to which institutions in one
sphere of the economy enhance the coordinating capacities of actors in it and in other
spheres (see also Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and 1995). A cluster of institutional
variables found in the different spheres of the economy serves as the basis by which
institutional complementarities form and develop.
Fourth, the importance of complementarities, in turn, lies in their effects on the
way in which firms coordinate their activities. The presence of institutional
complementarities provides firms with the capacities for market or strategic
coordination (Soskice, 1999). The importance of institutional complementarities is
highlighted through their capacity for structuring strategic interaction between
economic actors – a necessary condition for solving coordination problems facing firms
(see Hall and Thelen, 2009). The success of firms on product and service markets
require them to solve coordination problems in other spheres of the political economy:
to raise finance and govern relations between shareholders and other parties (corporate
governance); to regulate wages/working conditions and to secure the involvement of the
workforce (industrial relations); to ensure workers to have the requisite skills (education
and training); to secure access to inputs and technology (via inter-firm relations); and to
successfully compete for customers (product markets). Thus, the purpose of the
complementarities identified by the Varieties of Capitalism perspective should be assess
according to the extent to which institutions in one sphere of the economy enhance the
coordinating capacities of actors in it and in other spheres.
Drawing from the concepts associated with the new economics of organisation
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and 1995), the Varieties of Capitalism literature develops a
distinction between two modes of coordination: one based on competitive markets and
the other on strategic interaction, each of them associated with specific types of
institutional complementarities. The argument is that in order for institutions to
effectively support strategic (or market) coordination in one sphere of the economy, the
presence of institutions supporting analogous coordination in other spheres is required
(Hall and Gingerich, 2004). In other words, the impact of a single institution is
contingent upon the presence of others in the various spheres of the economy (Hall,
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1994). The approach suggests that successful economies cluster into identifiable groups
based on their reliance on market or strategic coordination.
The specification of two ideal-types - each with a distinctive set of institutions that
solve the coordination problems of firms in quite different ways -- is central to the
Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective. The first mode of coordination, which is
associated with liberal market economies, is characterised by firms coordinating their
activities with other actors through competitive markets, arms-length relations and
formal contracting. Important outcomes are accounted by the presence of clear market
signals and the primacy of prices. The second mode of coordination, associated with
Germany, Japan, and some northern European countries, is characterised by firms
coordinating their activities with other actors through numerous processes of strategic
interaction. 3 The outcomes are shaped by the extent to which institutions enable firms
to issue credible commitments to other actors. These commitments are generated by an
institutional framework that provides effective support for information-sharing,
monitoring, sanctioning, and deliberation (Culpepper, 2001). From this follow many
important contentions about variations in economic performance and national responses
to globalisation (Hall and Soskice, 2001a: 21-33).
Finally, Hall and Soskice also note that several OECD countries, including France,
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey, do not fit into either of the two ideal-types.
The presence of institutional hybridisation in these “Mediterranean” or mixed market
economies (MMEs) reflects the presence of recent histories of extensive state
intervention. The assessment of the Varieties of Capitalism on the nature of
coordination in MMEs is characterised by two potential scenarios. First, the presence of
institutional hybridisation in these economies entails that either CME or LME type of
coordination are not available since patterns of institutional complementarities at the
national level are not tight (Hall and Gingerich, 2004). These economies are missing out
on a fundamental aspect of coordination – namely that institutions that supports market-
type or strategic-type coordination in one sphere of the economy are unable to count on
the presence of institutions in other spheres that support analogous coordination.
3 Several countries - Austria, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland, and the
Netherlands are usually also identified as coordinated market economies despite some variation in their
domestic institutional framework. The key point is that economic activities are coordinated through non-
market mechanisms, not the specific institutions present in one country.
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Moreover, the reliance of MMEs on state intervention for the coordination of their
activities has rendered them vulnerable to the advent of liberalisation in the 1990s (Hall
and Thelen, 2005: 34-35). Second, an alternative scenario highlights the development of
coordination in specific niches of MMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 35). The institutional
arrangements of MMEs – such as Italy, and Spain – tend to resemble those found in
CMEs in the areas of corporate governance, but less so in the areas of industrial
relations (Hall and Soskice 2001: 21; Molina and Rhodes, 2007). The implication is that
strategic coordination can develop for activities where the contribution of institutions
found in the area of corporate governance is greatest – but cannot spread to the rest of
the economy.
1.2 Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Change
The study of the transformation of the electricity sector requires the use of theoretical
tools that can illuminate the process of change. The competitive environment in which
EU electricity companies found themselves in the last ten years is one of change
inspired and directed by the Commission. Therefore, the theoretical foundations of the
Varieties of Capitalism perspective, if they remain a necessary condition to account for
the evolution of the English and Spanish electricity sector, must provide insights that
will enable us to account for the consequences of institutional change. The theoretical
contribution of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective would be seriously weakened if
it was less successful in explaining change. Thus, an account of divergence across
national business systems requires an explanation of change.
The literature review presented in this section highlight the relevance of the key
concepts of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective – institutional interaction,
institutional complementarities, and institutionally-driven coordination – to account and
assess the occurrence of institutional change. The divergence between business systems
is not contingent upon the exclusive presence of institutional stability within national
economies – the absence of convergence also results from countries internally changing
in different ways. The EU driven processes of liberalisation of the electricity sector
entails that firms must adapt to a new competitive environment. The legal framework
that sustained the pre-liberalisation competition regime has been seriously eroded. How
12
firms will adjust to this exogenous shock? The Varieties of Capitalism perspective is
well suited to analyse this major economic event. After all, the analysis of institutional
diversity of Hall and Soskice (2001) is precisely embedded in a context of
Europeanization and globalisation policies. Their argument is that national economies
react in different ways to economic shocks and, moreover, national institutional
arrangements are critical in the differences observed in adjustment processes. The
Varieties of Capitalism perspective provides important insights on how national
economies are changing - that is in different ways and without strategic process of
convergence (Hall, 2007; Hall and Thelen, 2009).
The rest of section 1.2 is organised in the following manner. First, we review the
insights provided by the Varieties of Capitalism perspective in order to account for the
adjustment process of firms in subsection 1.2.1. Second, the liberalisation of the
electricity sector has been often accompanied by many other market enhancing
developments – most notably privatisation and the loss of monopoly status of national
companies. Domestic markets are open to foreign competition. As a result, takeovers
are becoming a new and important development in the analysis of the evolution of the
electricity sector. The Varieties of Capitalism perspective is also well suited to assess
the importance of this new development. The presence of variation on institutional
arrangements of corporate governance (and employment relations) impacts on the
importance of takeovers across national business systems. Therefore, we examine in
subsection 1.2.2 the insights provided by the Varieties of Capitalism perspective to
account for the diverging importance of takeovers for English versus Spanish electricity
companies.
1.2.1 Varieties of Capitalism and Varieties of Adjustment: Institutional Change in
Advanced Capitalist Economies
A central element of the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical framework is the notion of
cross-national divergence due to the presence of varieties of adjustment across advanced
capitalist economies (Hall, 2007; Hall and Thelen, 2009). The Varieties of Capitalism
theoretical perspective focuses on firms as the main actors in the process of
coordination of economic activities. The development of the core competencies of the
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firm in the process of economic coordination depends on the nature of the interactions
they develop with other actors, namely employees, business associations, suppliers, and
other firms. The institutional aspect of the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical
perspective manifests itself at this juncture – the nature of the relations they established
with other actors is largely shaped by the institutional support in which they are
embedded. National institutional frameworks in advanced capitalist economies enable
firms to coordinate their activities mainly in two ways. As mentioned previously, the
main distinction established by Hall and Soskice (2001a) is between liberal market
economies, where firms rely heavily on competitive markets to coordinate their
endeavours, and coordinate market economies, where more activities are coordinated
strategically. These different modes of coordination – that follows from differences in
national institutional frameworks - confer specific comparative advantages that mediate
the responses of firms to globalisation. In particular, patterns of institutional
complementarities enable arrangements in one institutional sphere of the political
economy to enhance the coordination process in others.
The contribution of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective to the study of
change builds around the crucial role of institutions in the adjustment process of
countries and companies. The importance of national institutional arrangements lies at
three levels. First, the character of existing institutional arrangements impact on the
process of change since the effects of a single institutional variable is contingent upon
the presence of other institutions in the economy (Hall, 1994; Hall and Franseze, 1998).
This statement is particularly appropriate in a context where institutional change tends
to be limited rather than full scale. Thus, new institutions (even if common across a
range of countries) interact with a (different) set of institutional arrangements that were
already in place thereby resulting in different interactive effects. Even when
developments across advanced capitalist economies refer to identically internal
institutional reforms, to conclude that they will have similar effects is misleading since
their impact is shaped by location specific institutional interaction effects (Hall and
Thelen, 2005: 30).
Second, the nature and speed of adjustment differ across advanced capitalist
economies because institutional arrangements provide interest groups with greater/lesser
influence over the implementation of changes. In particular, the institutional
arrangements of coordinated market economies are characterised by a greater number of
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actors that are involved in the decision-making process and possess full or suspensive
veto powers over the introduction of institutional change (Hall, 2007; Witt, 2006: 55-
84).
Third, institutional arrangements matter in the process of adjustment as actors
often seek institutional and functional equivalents to pre-existing forms of coordination
(Hall and Thelen, 2009). An analysis that focus entirely on the degree to which
institutions encourage/delay adjustment would miss the fact that institutional
constraints, if imposing too much rigidities and obstacle to change, are likely to create
pressures for actors to change them or operate outside their boundaries (Gilson, 2001;
Herrigel, 2008). National institutional frameworks preclude specific patters of
adjustment, but have the capacity to offer alternative adjustment paths that actors can
seize (Hancké and Goyer, 2005). The process of adjustment is also one where actors
take into account existing patterns of institutional complementarities and where firms
seek to sustain their competitive innovative competences by implementing changes that
do not affect the core nature of these complementarities. The implication is that while
economic liberalisation indeed entails a reinforcement of the role of markets in the
allocation of resources, the impact of these reforms sharply differs across national
institutional settings. The presence of variations in the existing coordinating strategies
of firms across national business systems is salient to the ways in which they will adjust
to new challenges. Firms do indeed seek to adapt to shifts on world markets but, at the
same time, would like to preserve their ability to sustain their competitive advantage in
the way they coordinate their activities. The implication of the above argument is that
one needs to distinguish between the character of coordination from the institutions that
support it (Hall and Thelen, 2009; see also Goyer 2006). The key issue is not
institutional change per se, but its impact on the coordinating activities of firms. The
occurrence of institutional change within countries does not imply the undermining of
critical differences across national business systems. For Hall and Thelen (2009),
however, the occurrence of institutional change in most cases does not impede on the
ways firms coordinate their activities.
Therefore, the Varieties of Capitalism perspective is highly suitable for the study
of institutional change. The occurrence of institutional change in coordinated and liberal
market economies is undeniable, but these two groups of capitalist economies are
changing in terms that are likely to leave them quite different. Hence, this perspective
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predicts substantial differences in the adjustment path of coordinated and liberal market
economies even if they proceed to further ‘liberalisation’. The Varieties of Capitalism
framework constitutes a theory of institutional change as “nations with a particular type
of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to develop complementarities
practices in other spheres as well” (Hall and Soskice, 2001a: 18). Thus, one should not
expect identical responses from them to globalisation.
1.2.2 Institutional Diversity and Varieties of Takeovers
A central issue of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective is the topic of corporate
governance, one aspect of which is the market for corporate control (Vitols, 2001: 337).
The issue of the market for corporate control (i.e. takeovers) is best understood in the
wider context of national systems of corporate governance (and to a lesser extent of
employment relations) whereby advanced capitalist economies differ along several
dimensions. The importance of the market for corporate control (i.e. takeovers)
constitutes one of the most distinctive features among national systems of corporate
governance. For the Varieties of Capitalism perspective, the presence of differences in
characteristics of the market for corporate control reflect the institutional variation
found within national business systems in the area of corporate governance (and also,
although to a smaller extent, employment relations). Four institutional features stand
prominently: ownership structure of listed companies, the system of corporate law and
its associated voting rights procedures, the degree of independence of regulatory
authorities responsible for the approval of takeovers, and the degree of
flexibility/rigidity of measures of employment protection (see Jackson and Miyajima,
2007; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The influence of takeovers over the evolution of the
electricity sector can be conceptualized as a series of institutional stages in which
managers seek protection from unwanted takeover bids.
The first stage is that of the ownership structure of the company. The presence of
ownership concentration implies that takeovers are negotiated. A dispersed ownership
structure, in contrast, leaves the firm open to unwanted takeover bids. The second stage
is related to the national system of corporate law and its associated rules governing
voting rights. National systems of corporate governance that protect the voting rights of
minority shareholders are more likely to experience a flurry of takeovers acting as a
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restructuring mechanism. By contrast, national systems of corporate governance that
enable management to implement substantial deviations from the one-share, one-vote
standard imply a reduced role for financial market pressures in the process of
adjustment of firms. The third stage refers to the degree of independence of regulatory
authorities in the process of takeover approval. A diffused ownership structure and a
system of equal voting rights for shareholders can be overcome if the relevant
authorities veto the acquisition of the firm by a rival – or make it prohibitively difficult
to proceed with the acquisition. The vesting of higher degress of independence in
regulatory authorities that are less open to influence from elected officials is more likely
to increase the prominence of takeovers within a national business system. The fourth
and final stage concerns the instituions of employment relations. The type of post-
aquisition strategy is shaped by the instittuional arrangements associated with the
system of employment relations. The ability to dismiss employees in a quick fashion
increases the range of motivations for acquiring firms and, as a result, heightens the
prominence of takeovers.
How do the institutional arrangements found in Britain and Spain shape the
importance of takeovers as a restructuring mechanism? What are the predictions that
flow from the insights of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective? First, the ownership
structure of companies still continues to differentiate advanced capitalist economies in
regard to the role and importance of takeovers. The dichotomy is best characterised by a
contrast between Anglo-Saxon economies where ownership is diffused (i.e. no single or
groups of shareholders owning a substantial percentage of equity capital) and the main
owners are institutional investors versus that of continental Europe and Japan where
ownership is concentrated in the hands of a small number of “strategic” players -
family, banks, or non-financial corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The
ownership structure of English and Spanish electricity companies conform to this
dichotomy (see Tables 1-3).
INSERT HERE ‘TABLE 1’: (SEE PAGE 47)
INSERT HERE ‘TABLE 2’: (SEE PAGE 48)
INSERT HERE ‘TABLE 3’: (SEE PAGE 49)
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In countries characterised by ownership concentration, the occurrence of hostile (or
unwanted) takeovers has been a rarity (Franks and Mayer 1997). The acquisition of a
firm would requite a potential bidder to secure the approval of the largest shareholder –
or convince the members of the shareholder group to sell their stakes. By contrast, the
absence of ownership concentration has entailed the possibility of unwanted takeover
bids. Managers possess serious incentives to pursue strategies that will increase the
stock market capitalisation of the firm and, in turn, make it more prohibitive for a
potential bidder to acquire the company. 4
Moreover, the importance of the ownership structures of companies manifests
themselves through their influence in shaping the preferences of the key shareholders
(Mayer, 1998; Vitols, 2001). Institutional investors in Anglo-Saxon economies take a
portfolio approach to risk management that, in turn, translates in their reluctance to
become central players in the decision-making process of firms. Instead, their
preferences lie in having portfolio companies achieving high rates of returns in their
shares. This sometimes led them to become active in pressuring firms to pursue
strategies that would result in increased share price, but with a purely shareholder value
maximisation concerns. Mutual and pension funds do not seek to substitute themselves
as the managers for portfolio companies. By contrast, shareholders in concentrated
ownership systems of corporate governance possess strategic and, at times, multiple
goals. For one thing, ownership is often embedded in a larger pattern of cross-share
holdings whereby firms hold stocks in each other as part of a strategy to protect
themselves against unwanted hostile takeover bids that would affect the capacities of
managers to develop the strategy of the firm with a long-term perspective. Another
motivation of large owners could be to extract private benefits from their control of the
corporation at the expense of minority shareholders – the dark side of ownership
concentration (Zingales 1998).
4 It is also interesting to note the links between preferences and takeovers. Empirical research on the
effects of takeovers have shown a substantial gains for the shareholders of the targeted firm – the impact
on the shareholders of the bidding firm being more ambiguous (Brickley, Jarrell and Netter 1988). Thus,
institutional investors are unlikely to constitute serious opponents to takeovers in Anglo-Saxon
economies.
18
The ownership structure of companies in Britain and Spain constitutes the first
stage of the institutional arrangements that are influential in the evolution of their
respective electricity sector. Ownership diffusion in Britain is conducive to takeover
bids and the presence of institutional investors interested in market capitalisation gains
reinforced this process. The presence of ownership concentration and of friendly, long-
term shareholders in Spain make it more unlikely that a restructuring of the sector
would take place through unwanted takeovers. However, the ownership structure of
companies only constitutes a first-cut approach. For one thing, managers can enact
panoply of anti-takeover measures to protect themselves against unwanted takeover bids
in ownership diffused systems of corporate governance. In addition, the degree of
ownership concentration in the electricity sector in Spain is important but not
insurmountable (see table 3). A committed bidder can focus on the acquisition of the
remaining free floats.
Second, institutional arrangements of national systems of corporate law shape the
ability of management to use defensive tactics that make it more difficult for bidders to
acquire firms – even those with a diffused ownership structure. Entrenched managers
can protect themselves against unwanted takeover bids through anti-takeover measures
that entail deviations from the one-share, one-vote principle. The issue of voting rights
is related to the process by which equity holders, especially institutional investors as
minority shareholders, translate their equity stake into voting power. Minority
shareholders prefer systems of corporate governance with the fewest deviations from
the one-share, one-vote standard (Davis Global Advisors, 2002; Franks and Mayer,
1997). This standard is one of the best means by which minority investors can
collectively achieve influence proportional to their stakes. Managers, in contrast, might
prefer to stabilise the ownership structure of the company by giving more power to
some shareholders, especially long-term owners.
There are two main deviations to the one-share, one-vote principle (Deminor
Rating, 2005; European Commission, 2007b). The first one falls under the category of
unequal voting rights. The most common form of unequal voting rights is the award of
multiple voting rights to certain shares by companies. Multiple voting rights are often
justified by the desire of firms to reward long-term investors, thereby cultivating a loyal
base of shareholders. But unequal voting rights can also be used by managers as a tool
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to provide hard core shareholders with a disproportionate voting influence in
comparison to their equity stakes. The second deviation to the one-share, one-vote
principle is that of voting rights ceiling that caps the amount of votes any investor may
cast regardless of the total number of stocks held. Voting rights ceilings may be used by
managers to protect themselves against the potential rise of a large investor in firms
with no loyal group of hard core shareholders. The expectation is that the use of
deviations from the one share-one vote principle is contingent upon the context in which
the ownership structure of the firm places management. Ownership ceilings are used
when long-term, friendly shareholders individually own a small equity stake. The aim is
to limit the power of a potentially threatening large investor. Unequal voting rights, on
the other hand, are more likely to be implemented to strengthen long-term, friendly
shareholders who already have a significant equity stake.
The use of deviations from the one-share, one-vote standards is permitted in both
Spain and the United Kingdom. However, the frequency of their use exhibits sharp
divergence. For example, only one of firm part of the UK FT 100 index had ownership
ceilings and none of them had unequal voting rights in 2002 (Davis Global Advisors
2002: 68). For the specific case of the electricity sector, golden shares were initially
introduced by the government. The golden share scheme acted as an impediment on
takeovers since no shareholder was allowed to control to control more than 15% of
outstanding shares (Oxera 2005). The first attempted takeover of a privatised electricity
company took place in December 1994 shortly before the expiration of the golden share
scheme in March 1995. Moreover, it is also worth noting that none of the privatised
electricity had any mechanisms of protection in the form of deviations from the one-
share, one-vote standard other than the golden share scheme resulting in a surge of
takeover activities after March 1995.
By contrast, the use of deviations from the one-share, one-vote standard is
widespread in the electricity sector in Spain. First, the three major electricity companies
(Endesa, Iberdrola, and Union Fenosa) are issuing two classes of stocks: voting and
non-voting shares. The latter are being used to raise capital without affecting the
company’s control structure since the holder is entitled to dividends but does not
possess any voting rights. Second, the voting rights at the largest two firms exhibit a
substantial deviation from the one-share, one-vote standard through the use of voting
caps (annual reports of Endesa and Iberdrola, various years). No shareholder may cast a
number of votes higher than that corresponding to 10 percent of the total outstanding
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shares. This deviation significantly increases the influence of loyal, long-term
shareholders.
Third, the degree of independence of regulatory authorities in the process of
takeover approval represents another institutional arrangement that differentiates CMEs
and LMEs in regard to the prominence of the market for corporate control. A diffused
ownership structure and a system of equal voting rights for shareholders can be
overcome if the relevant authorities veto the acquisition of the firm by a rival – or make
it prohibitively difficult to proceed with the acquisition. The degree of independence
and the nature of the powers of regulatory agencies (IRAs) responsible for takeover
approval are critical for the successful completion of takeover bids. A high degree of
independence for regulatory authorities is often seen as necessary given the perceived
unpopularity of acquisitions for employment – a concern magnify in the case of cross-
border deals. The presence of substantial variation in the degree of independence of
regulatory authorities can be observed across different national business systems in the
European Union – and also between Britain and Spain. Regulatory authorities in Britain
tend to be more independent from elected officials, as well as less discretionary and less
procedural in comparison to their Spanish counterparts (Ocaña, 2003; Thatcher, 2005).
The relatively underdeveloped degree of importance of regulatory authorities highlights
the presence of a trade-off where Spanish policy-makers have chosen to retain
flexibility over the actions of agencies – rather than pre-committing themselves to
specific policy outcomes (see e.g. Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002).
Fourth, the institutional arrangements associated with the system of employment
relations in Britain and Spain differ on two key features that, in turn, influence the type
of strategy that the acquiring firm could implement in a successful post-acquisition
phase of a takeover bid. In the first place, these two economies exhibit substantial
differences regarding legislative measures of employment protection (OECD, 1999).
There are several barriers to dismissal - regarding both full time and part-time
employment - present in Spain: delay to start a notice of dismissal, severance payment
after dismissal, definition of unfair dismissal, and the maximum number of allowed
successive fixed term contracts. Firms in non-liberal market economies cannot rely on
quick restructuring programs via employee dismissals as compared to their counterparts
in liberal market economies. In the second place, the distribution of firm-level legal
rights shapes the degree of involvement of employees that, in turn, affects that nature of
restructuring in the post-acquisition phase. The distribution of legal rights ranges from
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information, consultation, codetermination, and unilateral worker control over
restructuring issues (Knudsen, 1995). In Spain, the distribution of legal rights presents
management with serious constraints in the elaboration and implementation of the
strategy of the firm. By contrast, the relatively low influence of labour is shaped by the
strictness of their legal rights in the case of Britain. These legal differences relative to
the strictness of employment protection against involuntary dismissals and the degree of
legally entrenched participation translate into different motivations for takeovers. In
liberal market economies - where the ability of management to dismiss workers is
greater than that find in CMEs and MMEs - takeover gains often result from schemes
corporate restructuring and rationalisation costs that involve reduced levels of
employment (Deakin, et al., 2002; Jackson and Miyajima, 2007). The high takeover
premiums paid to the shareholders of targeted companies in LMEs can be recuperated
through economic gains that result from job losses.
1.3 State Intervention and the Political Origins of Institutions: A Critique of the
Varieties of Capitalism Perspective
The Varieties of Capitalism perspective has provided us with important insights on why
important, externally driven developments do not lead to convergence across national
business systems. The institutionally-inspired theory has significantly contributed to our
knowledge of change in national business systems – it has raised the prominence of
institutions as an independent variable and has highlighted the importance of studying
institutions in an interactive process rather than in a piecemeal fashion. Nonetheless,
several authors have raised issues with some aspects of the theory. The main line of
criticism levelled against this perspective is that it neglects the political dimensions of
the origins of institutional arrangements. The focus of the VoC perspective is on the
concept of coordination of the activities of firms that, in turn, limits its ability to account
for the moment of institutional creation (Howell, 2003; Morgan, 2005). For these
critics, the focus on coordination runs the risk of conceptualising the origins of
institutions and the occurrence of institutional change as a functional response designed
to solve economic coordination problems for firms. The emphasis of the VoC
perspective lies in the enhanced value of institutions for actors. They possess strong
incentives to maintain/establish/challenge institutional arrangements. The presence of
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institutional arrangements that serve to enhance the coordination capacities of firms
entails that national business systems with tight patterns of institutional
complementarities are unlikely to experience systemic transformations even under
conditions of Europeanization and globalisation (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 57). Critics of
the Varieties of Capitalism perspective, in contrast, analyses the origins of institutions
and the occurrence of institutional change as the products of political agenda and
purposive actions – the question of solving economic coordination problems playing a
minor role in this process (Morgan, 2005: 424). The presence of institutional
complementarities do indeed constitutes a source of economic efficiency – but the
origins of these institutional arrangements cannot be limited to economically-based
functional requirements. The issue is not to deny the importance of institutions on the
process by which firms coordinate their activities – but to expand on the range of
motivations of actors that have a bearing on this question. Otherwise, institutions
become conceptualises as the embodiment of self-(re)enforcing equilibrium whereby
change occurs as a result of exogenous shocks. The settings of the rules of the game are
important – thereby opening the possibility that actors might prefer an institutional
setup in which they are able to project their influence. The willingness of actors to
challenge/support the existing/emerging pattern of institutional complementarities
cannot be judged solely from the perspective of maximising economic returns (Deeg,
2005).
It is important to insist that the Varieties of Capitalism perspective does not
totally neglect the importance of politics in the process of institutional origins and
change. For instance, Hall (2005) highlights the need to differentiate between the birth
of institutional arrangements and the effects of these institutions once in place – the
place assigns to politics being more important for the former. The idea is that the
presence of many different types of motivations – including political ones – can be
associated with the birth of institutions. Nevertheless, the argument emphasising
institutional complementarities soon takes over as institutions act as lock-in
mechanisms and constrain possibilities for institutional change once they start to
provide increasing return to actors (Pierson, 2000). The concept of increasing returns
highlights the uneven developmental trajectories of different national business systems.
However, the inclusion of the concept of increasing returns raises two issues (see Deeg
2005). First, increasing returns are primarily defined in economic terms, therefore
23
neglecting the fact that actors are often as concerned with the power and status
outcomes of institutions as with their economic consequences. It remains to be proven if
actors will give up one set of institutions and replace them with another simply because
the economic returns from the former are apparently declining. Second, the
beneficiaries of existing patterns of institutional complementarities are assumed to be a
constant and single category of actors. The distribution of the payoffs associated with an
institutional setting is not necessarily constant over time with changes in the level and
locus of returns leading to different groups to evaluate the benefits of broad institutional
settlement differently over time.
The above discussion highlights an important issue with the Varieities of
Capitalism framework – namely the secondary role played by policy-makers that,
according to Howell (2003: 13), presents an “extremely thin notion of politics and state
action, in which governments act largely at the behest of employers”. The
autonomously defined choices of policy-makers constitute a major aspect in the process
by which firms coordinate their activities in advanced capitalist economies. The
importance of state activism builds from a fundamental criticism of the Varieties of
Capitalism theoretical perspective – namely that it downplays the importance of politics
and state action in advanced capitalist economies (Howell, 2003; Morgan, 2005). The
actions of policy-makers in the VoC perspective are largely seen within a context of
helping domestic firms in the processes by which their activities are coordinated
(Schmidt, 2006: 5). These critics do not assert that this perspective completely denies
the importance of politics. Rather, their argument seek to move beyond a conception
whereby state policies reflect the underlying institutional configuration of the political
economy that support the coordinating activities of firms, thereby only permitting
policies that accentuate the dominant form of coordination. Policy-making constitutes a
reflection of the existing mode of coordination with no autonomous role to play for state
officials. Therefore, a conceptualisation of state intervention is important to understand
the origins and impact of institutional arrangements across national business systems.
Institutional frameworks are indeed important – but constitute an intervening variable.
The implication is that the prominence of takeovers on the evolution of the electricity
sector in Britain and Spain ultimately reflects policy choices.
2. Takeovers and the Evolution of the Electricity Sector in Britain and Spain
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This section documents the different patterns of evolution of the electricity sector in
Britain and Spain. I summarize the role of takeovers on two indicators -- whether a few
firms dominate the industry or not; and the importance of foreign ownership in the
structure of private property.
2.1 The Case of Britain
Throughout the 1990s, the sets of policies known variously as privatisation,
liberalisation, deregulation, and the ‘British Model’ dominated the political agenda for
electricity utilities (Thomas 2001). The aim of these reforms consisted in a desire to
transform the electricity industry from a monopoly into a competitive market: the
creation of a spot market as the main price-setting arena for wholesale electricity sales;
the creation of retail competition so that all consumers can choose their electricity
supplier; and the corporate separation between generation and supply (see Thomas
2006a).
The electricity sector has experienced a huge amount of restructuring in the areas
of distribution and retail supply since its privatisation in 1990. Two key features
characterize the transformation of the sector: changing industry structure and
prominence of takeovers. First, there has been a complete redrawing of the profile of the
industry structure. In the wake of the privatisation process, there were three main
generators (National Power, Powergen and Nuclear Electric); and 12 regional
distribution/retail supply companies. All were initially protected from unwanted
takeover bids by the government’s Golden Shares scheme. This protection system
scheme ran out in 1995. The distribution companies were individually too small to have
had an impact outside the UK and were taken over by foreign companies as soon as
government protection from takeover was removed. The two more likely candidates to
become world players were National Power and Powergen, the two privatised
generation companies, which had between them a market share of about 80 per cent in
power generation in 1990. These two companies, however, were shadows of the firms
created a decade before - their market share in 1998 being about a third of what it had
been in 1990. By 2001, National Power had had to split itself into a UK company
(Innogy) and an international company (IPG) in order to insure its survival. In March
2002, Innogy was itself taken over by RWE. Powergen, on the other hand, was taken
over by E.ON in 2002.
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Second, takeovers of English electricity companies by foreign rivals have been
both prevalent and paramount (see Table 4). The regulatory system designed by Beesley
and Littlechild (1983) was intended to provide a structure that allowed free entry in the
market. Takeovers and mergers played a prominent role in this evolution as they were
interpreted as the exertion of a healthy sign of market discipline in competitive markets.
Takeover and mergers were of little concern as long the entry barriers were low enough
to maintain a realistic threat of competition (Thomas 2001).
INSERT HERE ‘TABLE 4’: (See PAGE 50)
Privatised electricity companies in Britain were initially protected from unwanted
takeover bids by a governments’ golden share scheme. The principle behind the golden
share scheme in each of the electricity companies was to allow time for the companies
to adapt to changed circumstances, free from the threat of a hostile takeover. In effect,
the golden share was a restriction on any one body from owning more than 15% of the
outstanding shares of an electricity company. Its expiration in March 1995, therefore,
removed this restriction and opened up the possibility of predators securing control of
the companies. This possibility was far from hypothetical since they offered the
prospect of secure, if unspectacular monopoly profits, good cash flows and access to
what were widely perceived to be substantial capital assets. The Government’s attitude
towards potential changes in ownership was also crucial (Deakin et al., 2002). Once the
first hostile takeover bid was announced there was considerable speculation as to the
likelihood of the bid being referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Committee (MMC).
The decision of the government not to make such a reference therefore gave an effective
green light to the acquiring ambitions of other companies.
Finally, it is important to point out that the ultimate outcome of the
transformation of the industrial profile of the electricity sector in Britain diverges
substantially from the original vision of Beesley and Littlechild. As noted by Thomas
(2003: 393), “the electricity companies in England were victims of the political and
regulatory desire to be seen to be creating a competitive industry”. The evolution of the
UK energy industry is noteworthy for the study of regulation since the centralised
electricity incumbent (CEGB) was split up both horizontally and vertically by political
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design. The political authorities limited its reconfiguration for quite some time through
strong policy against vertical integration. However, the ideal industrial structure, a full
de-integrated structure with competitive generation and retail services, has only been
partially achieved. The combination of structural split and liquid capital markets did
render English companies ripe for being the recipients of takeover bids from foreign
companies. Takeovers have not been a mean toward an end – they became the end in
themselves.
2.2 The Spanish Case
Electricity was first produced for public consumption in Spain in Barcelona in 1875.
Numerous small companies centred in the major towns developed from that time until
the end of the 19th century. At the beginning of the 1980s, the electricity sector
consisted principally of ten vertically integrated (generation, distribution and retailing)
regionally based companies with banks as substantial shareholders; and Endesa
(Empresa Nacional de Electricidad) -- the large state-owned company formed in 1944.
Endesa was initially only involved in generation. Private companies were obliged to buy
all of the electricity that Endesa generated (Salmon 1995: 153).
The nature of the importance of takeovers over the evolution of the Spanish
electricity sector can be observed at three stages. First, reorganisation of the electricity
industry became necessary in the 1980s as the result of two factors: the fragmented
pattern of production that arose from the historical evolution of the industry and the
serious financial problems facing the industry in the early 1980s. Policy-makers
sponsored a series of mergers and asset swaps (including interests in power generations)
between firms in the sector. For example, the three largest companies (Endesa, Hidrola
and Iberduero) agreed in 1984 to take over smaller loss-making companies in exchange
for government assistance. Fecsa (Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña), one of the
companies in most serious financial difficulties, was forced to sell some of its interests
in property and minerals as well as in electricity. The process continued through the
1980s and into the 1990s. The explicit support of the government strengthened the
incentives of firms to merge with other Spanish companies. Both Endesa – still a public
company at that time – and Iberduero (the predecessor of Iberdrola) embarked on an
aggressive policy of acquisitions and takeovers of their small competitors. (Crampes
and Fabra 2004; Arocena et al., 1999; Régibeau 1999 and Salmon 1995) By the end of
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1993, Endesa had acquired a myriad of regional electricity companies (ENHER,
Unelco, GESA, ERZ, Electra de Viesgo, Saltos del Nansa, and Sevillana de
Electricidad). In 1992 Iberduero merged with Hidrola that, in turn, led to the creation of
Iberdrola. By 1994 the only two companies outside these two groups were
Hidrocantábrico and Unión Eléctrica-Fenosa. The outcome was that the structure of the
electricity sector was fundamentally transformed through a series of mergers and asset
consolidation in anticipation of the future liberalisation of the market.
Second, the privatisation of Endesa in the mid 1990s was embedded in a process
of building national champions in the energy (oil, natural gas, and electricity) and
telecommunications sectors in preparation for the liberalisation of markets. The national
champions to be privatised in energy (oil, natural gas, and electricity) and
telecommunications sectors were seen as constituting the nucleus of the non-financial
Spanish private business sector (Boix, 1998; Etchemendy, 2004; Toral, 2008). As a
result, policy-makers privatised companies in successive waves of blocks of
approximately 10-20 per cent of total ownership. The long-term, friendly shareholders
of Endesa were essentially the large Spanish banks -- such as BBVA and BSCH. The
selection of domestically-based long-term oriented shareholders was undertaken with
the aim to preserve control by domestic interests in Endesa. Their ultimate equity stake
in privatised companies would fluctuate between 10 to 15 per cent of the equity capital.
These hard core shareholders were to insulate the management of privatised companies
against unwanted takeover bids. Moreover, policy-makers did retain a veto power over
future takeovers in the form of golden shares in privatised companies of ‘national
strategic interest’ – in practice, all the national champions. The golden shares
mechanism was also followed by the centre-right PP, which took office from 1996 to
2004. For the specific case of Endesa, policy-makers government established a 10 years
golden share expiring in June 2007 with the aim of protecting the managerial team from
any interference.
Third, the hostile bid placed by E.ON on Endesa constituted the third major event
illustrating the specific nature of takeovers in the evolution of the Spanish electricity
sector. A first hostile takeover bid had previously taken place in September 2005 when
Gas Natural, Spain’s largest gas company, launched a takeover bid for Endesa. The
launch of this takeover took place despite the market capitalisation of Gas Natural being
only about half that of Endesa (CNMV, 2006: 297). But while the ownership structure
of Gas Natural was highly concentrated, (La Caixa – a Catalan saving bank - owned
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33.06 per cent and Repsol YPF – an international Spanish oil and gas company - owned
33.84 per cent of the equity capital) the only remaining substantial Spanish shareholder
of Endesa at this juncture was the saving bank Caja Madrid with a 9 per cent stake since
La Caixa sold its 5 per cent stake in the first half of 2005. The launching of an hostile
bid for Endesa had been made posible because of two new developments. In the first
place, the Zapatero’s government decided to abolish the ‘protective’ golden share
scheme in November 2005 – before the expiration date that was June 2007 – in part due
to pressures from the European Commission. Secondly, the use of anti-takeover devices
in the form of deviations from the one share-one vote principle experienced a significant
regression resulting from a new piece of legislation passed in 2003. The new law
enables potential acquirers to issue a conditional takeover bid. The offer for the target
company can be made conditional upon the removal of deviations from the one share-
one vote principle (i.e. ownership ceiling in the Spanish case) at the next general
meeting. In other words, the use of deviations from the one share-one vote principle –
that had previously been voted as a bylaw at an AGM – could be removed after a
conditional takeover bid. Thus, potential acquirers of Spanish companies can now freely
bid without the fear of the newly acquired equity stake being limited to a voting rights
of ten percent.
In the meantime, a counter bid was placed by E.ON, Germany’s largest electricity
company, which valued Endesa at € 27bn as compared to the € 22.5bn offer made by
Gas Natural. The initial position of the Zapatero government during the gas Natural bid
was one of non-intervention in financial markets issues – the offer should be decided by
the shareholders of Endesa. However, Spanish officials immediately expressed their
disapproval and unwillingness to see a Spanish ‘national champion’ falling into foreign
hands. In fact, the Spanish Socialist government campaigned on behalf of what was
widely considered a less attractive bid for Endesa by the Spanish company Gas Natural.
The aim was to preserve a Spanish energy company large enough to compete in the
global marketplace. The Socialist government also opposed the E.ON bid on the ground
that Endesa, the largest Spanish electricity company, is a ‘strategic asset’ that should
remain in Spanish hands to guarantee the nation’s energy supply.
Moreover, the immediate context following the bid by E.ON immediately raised
the stakes for the Zapatero government. First, the Gas Natural bid was reviewed by the
Spanish Competition Tribunal or Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (TDC), which
recommended, in a non-binding opinion in January 2006, that the Spanish government
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should block the proposed Gas Natural/Endesa merger. The concern of the Competition
Tribunal was that the merger would significantly increase the degree of concentration in
the energy sector in Spain – Endesa being the dominant electricity company and Gas
Natural being the dominant gas company. In the same vein, the same body ruled that the
bid by E.ON did not raise competition concerns and should go ahead. Second, the EU
Commission also ruled in April 2006 that E.ON’s bid should also go ahead on the
grounds that it would not significantly impede competition in the EU or any substantial
part of it.5 The European Commission, in turn, also argued that E.ON was not present in
Endesa’s main market (Spain), and that the merging parties had limited overlapping
activities in other European electricity markets, such as Germany, France, Italy and
Poland. As a broad rule under EU law, the only grounds on which a merger or
acquisition can be blocked are that it would significantly reduce competition in a
relevant market in the EU. There are a few exceptions to this rule, but being a ‘foreign’
company is not one of them (Thomas, 2006c).
These two rulings forced the Spanish administration to act quickly as it was keen on
keeping Endesa as a Spanish ‘national champion’ rather than becoming a subsidiary of a
German firm. In February 2006, the Spanish government overruled the Competition
Tribunal’s recommendation that the Gas Natural bid should be blocked, and
conditionally approved it. As for the E.ON bid, Spain’s Council of Ministers adopted a
new legislative measure designed to increase the supervisory powers of the national
energy commission/regulator or Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE) over takeover
bids.6 Any acquisition of over 10 per cent of share capital in a regulated entity in Spain
would be subject to approval by the Spanish energy regulator, which would have broad
discretion to withhold approval – e.g. whenever an acquisition posed ‘risks’ in relation
to the regulated activities, or where blocking the acquisition was necessary to protect
‘the general interest’. This legislative measure, somewhat in an ironical manner, was
surprising because the main task of this agency was to provide advice to the ministry,
but did not have definite regulatory powers – by contrast to the British counterpart. The
Spanish government justified its decision to grant broader powers to the national energy
regulator with reference to Article 21(3) of the European Union merger regulation
which allows member states to block takeovers on the grounds of “public security”.
The immediate consequence was that the Spanish energy regulator imposed a number of
5 European Commission decision of April 25th 2006 in Case COMP/M.4110
6 Royal Decree-Law 4/2006.
30
conditions on the proposed E.ON takeover. These conditions included among others the
obligations to use Spanish-produced coal and retain Endesa’s assets outside Spain for at
least five years. The effect of the regulator’s conditions was the equivalent of a ‘poison
pill’ that reduces the attractiveness of the proposed bid.
In the meantime, Acciona (one of Spain’s largest construction company) took the
market by surprise when it bought 10 per cent of Endesa’s stock for €3.3 billion in late
September 2006. Its intention was to raise its stake in the electricity company to 24.9
per cent which under Spanish law 433/2003 would not require it to launch a formal
takeover bid for the whole company – the threshold for the latter being 25 per cent of
the equity capital. By mid-November 2006, Acciona became the largest shareholder of
Endesa with a 20 per cent stake, thus without crossing the 25 per cent ownership
threshold. The incursion of Acciona into the capital of Endesa pointed to a concerted
effort to disrupt E.ON’s bid with “government officials nudging their friends in industry
to block foreign firms from dominating Spain’s energy sector” (The Business, 28
October 2006). The aim was for Acciona to gather just enough voting rights to prevent
E.ON persuading other shareholders to overturn a crucial Endesa’s by law, namely the
imposition of a limitation on one party from voting more than 10 percent of the stock.
This was necessary for the completion of E.ON’s bid, whose goal was to obtain control
of at least 50 percent of the voting rights.
The initial response of E.On’s to Acciona’s incursion into the capital of Endesa was
to increase its bid by 40 percent to €37 billion – an increase of 100% in comparison to
its initial bid. However, time was running out on E.ON. In March 2007, Enel the main
Italian electricity operator spent almost € 8.4 billion to acquire 24.9 per cent stake in
Endesa. This action effectively dashed E.ON’s takeover hopes. The final joint offer was
€40.16 per share, or more than € 43.7 billion. It is important to note that the actions of
Accionna and Enel were coordinated. Their joint bid emerged after the Socialist
government sought a ‘Spanish solution’ to Endesa’s ownership and went ahead despite
failed court action by the European Commission. Spanish policy-makers thus succeeded
in their goal of keeping Endesa in Spanish hands with the involvement of Enel
constituting a reasonable compromise (Toral, 2008: 541). The equity holding in Endesa
by those two companies was 67 percent for Enel and 25 present for Aciona. However,
Endesa was to be run as a holding company for a 10-year period whereby Acciona
would hold 50.01% of the voting rights – thereby keeping the former in Spanish hands.
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3. Takeovers and the Evolution of the Electricity Sector in Britain and Spain:
Insights of the Varieties of Capitalism Theoretical Perspective
The liberalisation of European electricity has been a watershed event in the history of
the sector. It has resulted in many legislative and regulatory changes across member
states. The legal framework at the core of the previous competitive regime has been
seriously eroded. In turn, the liberalisation of the electricity sector at the EU level raises
questions about the distinctiveness of national models. In particular, the role of
takeovers as a restructuring mechanism has potentially risen in prominence given the
EU liberalising directives and the continuing control of member states over the opening
of new electricity plants. Takeovers constitute a privileged mode of entry into foreign
markets.
The occurrence of institutional change highlights the presence of substantial
sources of pressure related to the continuing distinctiveness and relevance of national
institutions. In particular, the ability of governments to influence policies has been
considerably in the new liberalised environment. Therefore, an account of the
(continuing) divergence across national business systems requires an evaluation of
change. We first analyse in this section the extent to which the insights of the Varieties
of Capitalism perspective provides a full account of the impact of the EU driven
liberalisation on the English and Spanish electricity sector in regard to the role of
takeovers. The contribution of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective in the analysis of
the impact of change in the electricity sector lies in highlighting how the process of
change is driven by the character of existing institutional frameworks. The second part
of this section presents a critique of the Varieties of Capitalism in the form of state
activism. The insights of state activism are connected to the political nature of the
origins of institutions.
3.1 VoC and Institutionally-Shaped Trajectories of Change
A fundamental contribution of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective lies in its ability
to link institutional frameworks with specific patterns of change. The occurrence of
common developments across national business systems does not lead to convergence
precisely since it is mediated by the presence of different institutional frameworks.
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Otherwise, the relevance of institutional variables would be seriously undermined. The
Varieties of Capitalism perspective highlights the presence of institutional differences
on the decision-making process in important issue areas as the refractor of new
developments. The role of institutional frameworks in shaping the direction and content
of change has figured prominently in this paper: the low prominence of takeovers in
Spain by foreign companies (section 2.2), and the high prominence of takeovers in
Britain (section 2.1).
Market for Corporate Control in Spain
The low prominence of the market of corporate control over the evolution of the
Spanish electricity sector has been shaped by key institutional arrangements found in
the spheres of corporate governance and employment relations. The first institution that
mediates against the prominence of takeovers in Spain is the ownership structure of
companies. By contrast to the complete dispersion of ownership that prevailed in
Britain, electricity companies in Spain are characterised by overall ownership
concentration. The stake of the hard core shareholding group in the three largest
companies was the following from 2000 to 2006: Endesa (between 9 and 29 per cent),
Iberdrola (between 13 and 27 per cent), and Union Fenosa (between 23 and 62 per cent)
(see Table 3). The stake of the individual members of the hard core shareholding group
was magnified due to the low attendance at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of
electricity companies. For instance, the quorum at the 2004 was 37.4 percent – thereby
increasing the voting power of core shareholders (Endesa, 2007: 82). The magnified
voting power of core shareholders, however, is limited to 10 per cent of the voting
rights of electricity companies in Spain. The institutional arrangements of corporate law
allow companies to implement deviations from the one share-one vote principle. The
three largest electricity companies have relied on voting ceilings as a form of protection
against takeovers. The use of voting ceilings prevented a full magnification of the
powers of hard core shareholders, but also served to protect against the predatory
actions of uninvited bidders.
The low prominence of takeovers in the Spanish electricity sector also reflected
the institutional arrangements associated with the regulatory approval of M&A. Overall,
the process of delegation to NRAs in Spain is characterised by the presence of two
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regulatory authorities – the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal de Defensa de la
Competencia) and the National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energia) --
that are issuing non-binding recommendations. In other words, regulatory authorities
possess some degree of independence, but these institutions act as advisories body for
the sponsoring ministry which monopolises most important decision-making functions
(Genoud, 2003). A final institutional hurdle in the market for corporate control in the
Spanish electricity sector is the rigid regime on dismissals in employment relations (see
OECD, 1999). This institutional arrangement impacts on the motivations of bidding
companies. The post-acquisition options for successful bidders are limited. The ability
to implement restructuring schemes involving important layoffs are difficult to
implement and, as a result, cannot be used as a strategy to compensate for takeover
premium fees.
These four institutional features – ownership concentration, voting ceilings, lower
degrees of independence, and rigid labour markets – strongly militated against the
occurrence of takeovers in the evolution of the Spanish electricity sector. These
institutional arrangements are complementary – the presence of one improves on the
effectiveness of others. For instance, the ability of concentrated pattern of ownership to
deter takeover bids is reinforced by the by-law that limits the voting power of potential
bidders. Similarly, the E.ON (and Gas Natural) bid for Endesa reflected the growing
ownership diffusion at Endesa by 2005 (see Table 3). Otherwise, it would have been
extremely difficult for E.ON to even envisage the possibility of a successful takeover
bid for Spain’s largest electricity firm.
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Market for Corporate Control in Britain
The evolution of the electricity sector in Britain constitutes the paradigmatic case of
takeovers exercising a high degree of prominence over its evolution. The entire
privatised electricity sector has been the target of successful takeover bids from foreign
companies. The bulk of these successful takeover bids, moreover, were unsolicited.
Incumbent management either fought these bids or gave up early in the face of
insurmountable odds (Deakin et al., 2002). The liberalisation of the electricity sector
was an important event in the regulation of network industries and constituted an
integral part of Thatcher’s program to roll back the state and to assign greater
prominence to market mechanisms in the allocation of resources (Thomas, 2001 and
2006a). In particular, the Thatcher administration viewed favourably the introduction of
competition in the sector via the entry of new players in the market. The market for
corporate control, in this context, was interpreted as a source of discipline on the
management of electricity companies. However, the ultimate outcome of the
transformation of the electricity sector in Britain is one where the industry is currently
dominated by a fewer (as compared to 1990) number of firms involved in both
generation and distribution and, moreover, with little incentives to compete against each
other (Thomas, 2006b). This outcome was not anticipated or initially planned by policy-
makers – takeovers were conceptualised as a mean (not an end) for achieving greater
competition in the electricity sector (Helm, 2003). Why have takeovers trumped other
factors in the evolution of the electricity sector?
The argument presented in this paper highlights the role of institutional
frameworks in mediating a new development – namely the preferences of policy-makers
for greater competition in the sector. State officials might possess defined preferences
for the evolution of the sector, but institutional frameworks shape how those preferences
eventually influence the evolution of the sector. In particular, the decision to frame
competition as the break-up of the market power of the National Power-Powergen
duopoly led to an unintended consequence: the predominance of takeovers over other
factors in the evolution of the electricity sector. Two central aspects of the institutional
framework in which English electricity companies were embedded militated for the
importance of the market for corporate control. First, the decision to frame the notion of
competition as the break-up of the market of the duopolistic system was not neutral in
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regard to the future direction of the sector. It meant that takeovers by foreign firms were
not seen as a threat to competition as compared to the duopolistic structure of the sector.
This particular framing must be seen in the context of the dispersed ownership structure
of companies and the overall respect of the one share-one vote principle. The
conceptualisation of competition as the breaking-up of the domestic duopoly at the
expense of other factors was conducive to the prominence taken by takeovers, not
because of the preferences of policy-makers, but as a result of under-emphasising the
consequences associated with ownership dispersion and a system voting rights that is
protective of minority shareholders. The process of framing competition as the break-up
of the domestic duopoly would have produced different consequences if the ownership
structure of companies had been characterised by ownership concentration and/or
deviations from the one share-one vote principle would have been more widespread.
Second, several aspects of the regulatory framework of the electricity sector in
Britain are largely immune from the influence of elected officials. The institutions
associated with the regulatory approval of takeovers possess a life of their own and,
therefore, mediate the influence of the choices of policy-makers. Elected officials might
possess defined preferences about the nature of competition, but specific aspects of the
institutional framework promote certain outcomes over others. For instance, one of the
most influential institutions in the area of M&A approval in the United Kingdom is the
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. The raison d’être of the Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers is to protect the rights of minority shareholders during takeover bids (Kenyon-
Slade, 2004). This mission is enshrined in the principle of equal treatment for minority
investors – the price per share offered by the bidding firm must be the same for all
categories of shareholders; board members are subject to a fiduciary duty of good faith
that limits their ability to support anti-takeover devices; and a bidder must make a
formal offer for the entire stock capital of the firm if its stake crosses the 30 per cent
threshold. The rights of employees are limited and confined to the area of consultation
during takeover bids (Deakin et al., 2002). Moreover, the Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers is a self regulatory body that derives its legitimacy from the support it receives
from the institutional investors’ community – the biggest category of shareholders in the
United Kingdom. The implication is that takeover proposals that make their way to the
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers stand an excellent chance of being approved provided
that the rights of minority shareholders are respected.
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3.2 State Activism and the Origins of Institutions
The argument presented in this paper is that while the Varieties of Capitalism
perspective is crucial to understand the transformation of the Spanish electricity sector
on two new challenges – it needs to be complemented. The insufficient character of this
perspective to fully account for the evolution of the English and Spanish electricity
sector is analysed through the angle of the origins of institutions.
An important line of criticism directed at the Varieties of Capitalism perspective is
that it underplays the importance of politics and conflict in the process by which
institutions originate. This shortcoming is important since it impedes on its ability to
capture all potential scenarios of change (Howell, 2003; Morgan, 2005). State
intervention is conceptualised as an enabling mechanism in the process by which firms
coordinate their activities – i.e. the actions of policy-makers perform the role of a
supporting actor to the existing mode of coordination. The focus on coordination
obscures the issue that efficiency concerns constitute only one potential motivation of
policy-makers in the origins of institutional arrangements (Deeg, 2005). State officials
possess multiple sets of preferences that range beyond the narrow realm of the
coordinating capacities of firms. I analyse in the rest of this section two instances where
state intervention took place with aims different than the sustainability of the
coordination of firms´ activities: the imposition of constraints on the activities of
Spanish firms; and the privatisation and breaking-up of the National Power-Powergen
duopoly in Britain.
State Constraints in Spain
The image of state officials intervening with the sole aim to enabling firms to sustain
their coordinating activities does not capture the extensive range of motivation of
Spanish policy-makers. In particular, policies have often been introduced and
implemented against the preferences of domestic companies – thereby, making it
extremely difficult to argue that the primary aim of state intervention is to enable firms
to better coordinate their activities. State officials have autonomously derived
preferences that they have carried out often against the wishes of powerful actors. For
instance, the regulation of electricity tariffs is characterised by the imposition of tight
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upper limits that seriously limits the ability of firms to insure their profitability through
prices (Arocena et al., 2002; Fraser, 1999: 9-13). Increases in the price of electricity
have often been lower than rates of inflation (Arocena et al, 2002: 886). Firms have
been faced with serious incentives to adjust and save costs in order to compensate for
the low tariffs. Moreover, the low electricity tariffs took place in a context of fast rising
demand for electricity in Spain – an almost 100 per cent increase between 1994 and
2006 (CNE, 2007: 19). Policy-makers did not try to slow down the increases in demand
for electricity via higher prices. The upshot is that large electricity firms have been
incentivised to expand their supply capacities via the construction of new plants.7
Another set of constraints resulting from state policies has been the imposition of
several vetoes on the attempts by domestic firms to merge between themselves. Policy-
makers have been highly supportive of the international expansion of domestic firms –
but have been at times reluctant to see them merge between themselves for issues of
competition in the Spanish market (Crampes and Fabra, 2004: 13-15). Three major
attempts of domestic mergers had been blocked: Endesa-Iberdrola (2001), Union
Fenosa-Hidrocantabrico (2000), and Gas Natural-Iberdrola (2003). Moreover, policy-
makers introduced legislation that limited cross-shareholdings to a threshold of three
percent between banks and electricity companies in the late 1990s. The aim was to
promote the development of market forces in the sector. These two constraints on the
actions of domestic companies highlight the fact that state intervention is not reducible
to the coordinating needs of firms. 8
Privatisation and Breaking-up of the Duopoly Structure in Britain
The nature of state intervention was crucial in the evolution of the electricity sector in
Britain – and the prominent place that takeovers did occupy. The policy outputs of the
British state cannot be reduced solely in terms of issues related to the processes by
7 The Spanish state has been helpful at this juncture by making it harder on foreign firms to secure
approval for the construction of new plants (Arocena et al, 1999). However, this form of protectionism
did not imply the inactivity of domestic firms – new plants were built in order to meet the rising demand.
8 The constraints on mergers between domestic companies have been recently relaxed – Spanish policy-
makers viewed favourably the two domestic bids for Endesa (Gas Natural and Acciona) and the
acquisition of Union Fenosa by Gas Natural. Moreover, limits on cross-shareholdings between banks and
electricity companies have been lifted. The realistic and growing threat of takeovers by foreign bidders
has forced policy-makers to encourage domestic solutions for sustaining ownership concentration of
domestic companies. Nonetheless, these examples highlight the willingness of state officials to implement
policies that run counter to the preferences of large domestic electricity companies.
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which firms coordinate their activities in the new liberalised environment. The
complexity of state intervention in the electricity sector was tightly bound to two related
questions – namely the choice of a dispersed ownership structure in the privatisation of
electricity companies and the breaking-up of the duopoly structure.
The process of privatisation of electricity companies in Britain and the breaking
up of the duopoly structure of the sector highlighted the presence of many preferences
by policy-makers. The characteristics of privatisation and the process by which the
duopoly structure was broken up were the outcomes of several and different factors. The
sets of preferences of policy-makers went beyond the narrow concept of firm
coordination. First, the process of privatisation in Britain was also motivated by a desire
to reduce the role of the state in the electricity sector. The aim was to replace the tightly
regulated monopolistic environment with one where greater competition would deliver
electricity at competitive prices (Coen and Thatcher, 2000). The process of turning the
former core monopolies into competitive organisations, in turn, carries substantial
policy implications for the evolution and transformation of the electricity sector. The
breaking-up of the duopolistic structure was seen as a necessary condition for the
introduction of greater competition (Helm, 2003; Newbury, 2004; Thomas, 2006a). This
meant that UK policy-makers did use their veto powers over attempts by National
Power and Powergen to acquire other domestic companies – but not when foreign firms
launched takeover bids for smaller English electricity units (Loredo and Suarez, 2000:
72). Moreover, the choice of a dispersed ownership structure for privatised companies
was driven by the idea that takeover threats would result in the imposition of market
discipline on companies – otherwise they would end up being the target of unwanted
takeover bids (Helm, 2003; Littlechild, 1988). The prominence of takeovers was
interpreted as a check on managerial inefficiency. Ownership diffusion came to be
associated with greater competition via greater market discipline resulting from
exposure on the market for corporate control.
Second, the policy choices of UK policy-makers were also tied to the idea of
reducing the power of militant trade unions in the sector (Thomas, 2005; Ridley, 1991;
Walker, 1991). Trade union militancy was seen as an obstacle to the proper functioning
of markets. The argument of the Thatcher administration was that the power of trade
unions would be substantially reduced in the case of the fragmentation of the sector –
thereby providing further impetus for breaking-up the National Power-Powergen
duopoly (Helm, 2003: 89). The influence of trade unions was seen as more likely to be
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limited in conditions of perfect competition as opposed to an oligopolistic/monopolistic
industry structure. In particular, the unchecked behaviour of union monopolies (notably
coal) came to threaten security of supply.9 Hence, it is no surprise that the process of
privatisation under Thatcher was also associated with the breaking up of the large
monopolies and the introduction of competition – two factors that were bound to have
an impact on trade union power. The negative influence of trade unions militancy was
seen as more difficult to sustain in competitive markets than if the firm was operating as
a monopoly. The break-up of companies upon privatisation, moreover, would further
fragment union power. The breaking-up of a monopolistic position was appealing to
Thatcher and complemented her distrust of large corporate entities and of neo-
corporatist bargaining (Helm, 2003: 89). Moreover, the use of ownership diffusion in
the privatisation of electricity companies further reduced the power of trade unions. The
bargaining power of trade unions tends to be stronger and more developed in the
presence of ownership concentration since management does not have to worry about
takeover threats.
4 Conclusion
The advent of liberalisation has not induced convergence between national models of
capitalism. The analysis of the cases of the English and Spanish electricity sector
performed in this paper illustrates quite well the prominence of national institutions of
corporate governance and the centrality of patterns of re-regulation. The institutionally-
based Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective and the notion of state activism
share great scepticism on the notion that liberalisation results in a race toward the
bottom of the lowest standards. However, each remains individually incomplete to fully
account for the specific nature of the role of takeovers in the transformation of the
electricity sector in Britain and Spain. The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has
provided essential insights for understanding the viability of economic divergence in an
age of greater economic integration – but the perspective is more explanatory powerful
when complemented with notions of state activism. The impact of the institutions of
corporate governance (and employment relations) is mediated by their interaction with
9 The electricity supply industry depended on coal for three-quarters of its output (Newbery, 2004: 2).
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the wider institutional framework in which they are embedded. In particular, it is within
their interaction with the choices of policy-makers that institutional frameworks matter,
not by themselves.
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11.1(3)
Prudencial
Friend Provi
Norwich
12.3 (2)
Prudential
Robert
Fleming
18.5 (3)
Prudential
Friends Prov
Legal&General
19.8(4)
Prudential
Barclays
Friends Prov
Rockleigh
23.8(4)
Prudential
Robert Flem
Barclays
Gartmore
21.9(5)
Morgan
Prudential
Norwich
Friends Prov
CIN Manag
8.1(1)
Prudential
29(4)
Welsh Water
Norwich
Prudential
Friends Prov
22.1(3)
Prudential
Robert Flem
British Rail
Pension
Trustee
15.2(2)
Prudential
Robert Fleming
1993
17.5(4)
Prudential
Robert Flem
Abu Dhabi Bank
Sun Life Inv
7..9(2)
Prudential
Barclays
16.6 (4)
Prudential
Robert Flem
Henderson
Gartmore
Inv
11.2(2)
Prudential
Norwich
Union
12.3 (2)
Prudential
Legal&Assur
16.5(3)
Prudential
Barclays
Sun Life
Corp
22.7(4)
Prudential
Barclays
Norwich
Gartmore
24.1(5)
Norwich
Morgan Gre
Prudential
CIN Manag
Chase Man
8.4(1)
Prudential
22.6(6)
Norwich
Prudential
Nat. Westmi
Friends Prov
Chase Nomi
Capital
25.6(3)
Prudential
Gartmore
Robert
Fleming
22.1(4)
Prudential
Robert Fleming
Bank of New
York
AMAP Asset
Mgrs. Ltd
1994 9..5(2)
Prudential
Sun Life Inv
4.7(1)
Prudential
14.8 (4)
Prudental
Fleming Inv
Gartmore
Inv
Standard Lif
6.5(1)
Prudential
N/A 20.1 (3)
Prudential
Bank of New
York
Norwich
11.3(2)
Norwich
Prudential
7..9(1)
Prudential
14(3)
Norwich
Prudential
Friends Prov
11.5(1)
Prudential
8.6(2)
Prudential
Bank of New
York
1995
16.1(4)
Prudential
Sun Life Inv
Capital Grop
Standard Lif
N/A 11.4(3)
Prudential
Standard Lif
Noewich
16.7 (4)
Prudential
B.A.T Indust
Leagl&Genen
Norwich
9.5(2)
Prudential
Legal&Assur
6.4(1)
Prudential
24.2(4)
Prudential
Bank of New
York
Norweb
Norwich
10.5(2)
Norwich
Prudential
7..8(1)
Prudential
22.2(5)
Norwich
Prudential
Friends Prov
Standard Liv
Francklin Re
15.9(2)
Prudential
Standard
Life
14(3)
Swiss Bank
Prudential
Standard Life
1996
7.1(1)
Prudential
3.4(1)
Norwich
15.7 (2)
National
Power
Prudential
8.3(2)
Prudential
Standard Life
1997
12.6 (2)
Prudential
Capital
Source Annual Reports
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Table 2 Equity Holding by Substantial Shareholders (Aggregate Equity Stake and Number of Institutional Investors) in British Electricity Companies (RECs) %
National Power PowerGen Scottish Power Scottish and Southern
Years State Institutional
Investors
State Institutional Investors State Institutional
Investors
State Institutional Investors
1991
39.1 6.9
Nomura Securities
40.5 4.0
Nomura Securities
3.5 3.4
1992
39.1 4.3
Schroder Investment
40.5 3.1
Prudential
3.6 8.5(2)
Morgan Gren, Prudential
3.4 8.3(2)
Morgan Gren, Provident Mutual
1993
39.1 4..3
Schoder Investment
40.5 3.1
Prudential
3.6 7.7(2)
Prudential, Norwich
3.4 3.1
Gartmore
1994
39.1 39.7 5.0
Prudential
3.6 3.4(1)
Prudential
3.4
1995
N/A N/A 3.1 5.0
Prudential
3..5(1)
Prudential
N/A N/A
1996
N/A N/A 3.1 7.6(2)
Prudential and Bank of New YorK
4..5(1)
Prudential
N/A N/A
1997
3.0
The Capital Group
10.5 (2)
Prudential and Bank of New YorK
7..2(1)
Prudential
3.1
Standard Life Group
1998
N/A N/A 11.1(2)
Prudential and Bank of New YorK
7.7(1)
Prudential
N/A N/A
1999
9.9 (2)
Merry Lynch Franklin Resources
11.1 (2)
Prudential and Bank of New YorK
6.6(1)
Prudential
N/A N/A
2000 20.1 (4)
Bank of New York
Frankin Re, Brandes Invest,
Prudential
3.8(1)
Prudential
7.4(2)
Prudential, FMR Corp
2001
26(4)
Brandes Invest, Capital Group,
Franklin Resour, CGNU,plc
11.2(3)
Putman Investment, CGNU,
Prudential Corp
4.1
Prudential
2002 9.1(2)
Capital Research, Barclays
7.0(2)
Prudential, Barclays
2003
17.9(4)
Capital Research, Barclays,
Prudential ,Legal&General
6.4(2)
Leagl&General Group,
Prudential
2004 19.9(4)
Capital Research, Barclays,
Legal&General, Prudential
10.1(3)
Prudential, Legal&General
Group, FMR Corp
2005 14.7(3)
Capital Research, Legal&General,
Barclays,
7.3(2)
Barclays, Legal&General Group
2006 3..3(1)
Barclays Bank
10.3(3)
Capital Group, Legal&General,
Barclays
Source: Annual Reports
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Table 3 Equity Holding by Substantial Shareholders in Spanish Electricity Industries (%)
Endesa Iberdrola Unión Fenosa
Years Domestic Friendly Foreign Inst. Inv. Domestic Friend Foreign Inst. Inv. Domestic Friendly Foreign Inst. Inv.
2000 Caja Madrid
Caixa
5.1
5.0
BBVA
BBK
9.9
5.1
Chase M
Franklin Res
10.2
5.0
BSCH
Caixa Gal
Banco
Pastor
11.8
6.6
4.2
2001 Caja Madrid
Caixa
BBVA
5.1
5.0
2.5
Chase M 6.5 BBVA
BBK
8.6
7.5
Chase M
Franklin Res
10.2
5.0
BSCH
Caixa Gal
Banco
Pastor
13.7
6.7
3.9
E.ON 4.9
2002 Caja Madrid
Caixa
5.1
5.0
Chase M 6.4 BBVA
BBK
9.4
7.5
Chase M
Franklin Res
10.2
5.0
BSCH
Caixa Gal
Banco
Pastor
14.2
6.8
3.7
2003 Caja Madrid
Caixa
BBVA
5.1
5.0
2.5
Chase M 5.7 BBVA
BBK
9.9
5.1
Chase M
Franklin Res
10.3
5.0
BSCH
Caixa Gal
Caja Med
Caixanova
Banco
Pastor
23.4
7.1
3.7
3.1
3.8
E.ON 5.0
2004 Caja Madrid
Caixa
5.1
5.0
Chase M 5.7 BBVA
BBK
9.8
5.0
Chase M
Cartera e Inv
9.6
7.4
BSCH
Caixa Gal
Caja Med
Caixanova
Banco
Pastor
22.0
5.4
4.1
4.0
3.8
2005 Caja Madrid 9.0 Chase M
Axa
State Strt
5.7
5.3
5.0
BBK
BBVA
7.5
5.4
Chase M 8.4 ACS
Caixa Gal
Caja Med
Caixanova
Banco
Pastor
34.5
9.9
4.0
4.0
3.8
2006 Caja Madrid
Acciona
9.0
20
Axa 5.3 ACS
BBK
BBVA
10
9.9
7.5
ACS
Caixa Gal
Caja Med
Caixanova
Banco
Pastor
40.5
8.0
5.1
5.0
3.8
2007 Acciona
+
Enel (Italy)
25
67
ACS
BBK
Caja
Valencia
7.2
7.1
6.0
ACS
Caja Med
Caixanova
Caixa Gal
Banco
Pastor
45.3
5.1
5.0
5.0
2.6
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TABLE 4 British Electricity CompaniesTake-overs and mergers for the REC (Regional Electricity company)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2007 Trade name
National Power Innogy RWE RWE Innogy
Powergen E.ON Powergen Powergen
ScottishPower Iberdrola ScottishPower
Scottish Hydro SSE SSE SSE
National Grid N Grid Tra National Grid N Grid Transco
Eastern distrib Hanson Trust Energy Group Texas Utils EDF EDF 24Seven
Eastern supply Hanson Trust Energy Group Texas Utils E.ON Powergen Powergen
EMidlanddistrib Dominion Powergen E.ON EMidlandsElec E Midlands Elec
EMidlandsupply Dominion Powergen E.ON Powergen Powergen
London distrib Entergy EDF EDF 24Seven
London supply Entergy EDF EDF London Electric
Manweb distrib ScottishPower SPManweb SP Manweb
Manweb supply ScottishPower ScottishPower ScottishPower
Midlands distrib Avon Energy GPU Aquila EON Aquila
Midlands supply Avon Energy National
Power
Innogy RWE RWE NPower
Northern distrib CalEnergy CEElectric Northern Electric
Northern supply CalEnergy Innogy RWE NPower
Norweb distrib NW Water UUitilities United Utilities
Norweb supply NW Water Texas
Utils
E.ON Powergen Powergen
Seeboard distrib C&SW Corp AEP EDF EDF 24Seven
Seeboard supply C&SW Corp AEP EDF EDF Seeboard Energy
Southern distrib SSE SSE SSE Power Dist
Southern supply SSE SSE Southern Electric
SWALEC
distrib
Welsh Water WPD WPD WPD
SWALEC
supply
Welsh Water British Energy SSE SSE Swalec Electric
SWEB distrib Southern Co WPD WPD WPD
SWEB supply Southern Co EDF EDF SWEB
Yorkshiredistrib Y’shire
Holding
MidAmerican
Energy
CEElectric Y’E’ Distrib
Yorkshiresupply Y’shire
Holding
Innogy RWE RWE NPower
Source Annual Reports
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